The Pentagon is positioning its warriors for an attack on Iraq. They have resumed anthrax inoculations for troops destined to fight a new desert war. They are releasing Special Operations forces to the CIA, so that their counterterrorism elite can operate without the Defense Department having to admit that armed forces are engaged in the Middle East. Thousands of Marine and Army personnel, ostensibly troop replacements, are being deployed in Kuwait with heavy armor, including M-1A1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles.

On September 19, the Bush regime released the report, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, detailing a new doctrine of striking America’s foes before they have a chance to strike America. The administration’s preemptive strike policy, presumably based on the principle of anticipatory self-defense, presents a radical change in the United States’ defense posture. Historically, grave and imminent threats to national security triggered the right to anticipatory self-defense. Under the new policy, official belief that a nation desires to acquire weapons of mass destruction is enough to justify the use of force. Judged with this criterion in mind, Iraq is legitimately and unilaterally subject to the military might of the United States.

Calling the new defense philosophy “a distinctly American internationalism,” the authors of the report—primarily National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, although Bush allegedly edited the document to eliminate some arrogant sounding phrases—pledge the use of military force to encourage “free and open societies,” to fight for American ideals and values, especially private property, and to win the “battle for the future of the Muslim world.”

On the same day that the White House unveiled its doctrine of pre-emption, Bush asked Congress for authorization “to use all means that he determines to be appropriate, including force, in order to enforce the United Nations Security Coun-

The administration’s preemptive strike policy, presumably based on the principle of anticipatory self-defense, presents a radical change in the United States’ defense posture.”

However, Bush’s war efforts are not popular among all whom he wishes to rally to his cause. Wisconsin Senator Russell Feingold reflected the opinion of many when he noted that the language of Bush’s resolution “appears to actually authorize the president to do virtually anything anywhere in the Middle East.” In explaining the wording of his resolution, Bush told reporters, “If you want to keep the peace, you’ve got to have the authorization to use force.”
A Shriek for War (Continued from page 1)

as may be feasible." Or, in other words, when it is convenient to do so.

Other prominent Democratic politicians have challenged Bush’s politics. Former, and probably future, presidential contender Al Gore blasted Bush’s approach, characterizing the president’s posture as a “do-it-alone, cowboy-type reaction to foreign affairs.” Suggesting that the administration is going after Iraq because Saddam Hussein is more visible than Osama bin Laden, Gore accused the president of operating “in a manner calculated to please the portion of its base that occupies the far right.” Bush’s words and deeds were creating, in Gore’s opinion, an image of the United States as a danger to the world. There is “great anxiety all around the world, not primarily about what the terrorist networks are going to do, but about what we’re going to do,” he said.

On the floor of the Senate, another probable presidential contender, South Dakota’s Tom Daschle, cited evidence that the Bush camp was using the war for political purposes. He pointed to comments by Matthew Dowd, a pollster for the White House and the Republican National Committee, who said, “the No. 1 driver for our base motivationally is this war.” When asked by a reporter from The New York Times why Iraq suddenly became a threat now rather than earlier in the year, Bush’s chief of staff Andy Card answered, “From a marketing point of view, you don’t introduce new products in August.” And perhaps most damning of all, in Daschle’s eyes, was a computer disc found in Lafayette Park containing this advice from Bush advisor Karl Rove: “Focus on War.” What moved Daschle to present this evidence? The day before, Bush had suggested that the Democrats did not really care about national security.

Not only are politicians criticizing the president’s war desire, but some high-ranking military brass have admonished Bush for his hasty move toward war. In testimony before Congress, former chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili, NATO military commander Wesley Clark, and other generals were clearly anxious over the possibility of a war with Iraq, especially the idea of action without U.N. backing. They expressed concern that attacking Iraq would distract from the war on terrorism and help al-Qaeda recruit more warriors to their cause.

Doubts exist abroad, as well, and we need not look to Russia for opposition to Bush’s strident war cry. In a country crucial to Bush’s hopes for a broad coalition to justify a war on Iraq, Schwäbiesches Tagblatt, a regional German newspaper, quoted then Justice Minister of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s Social Democratic government, Herta Däubler-Gmelin, as saying, “Bush wants to divert attention from his domestic problems. It’s a classic tactic. It’s one that Hitler also used.” Her comparison came on the heels of the Social Democrats’ parliamentary floor leader Ludwig Stiegler likening Bush to the bloodthirsty Roman emperor Augustus. Ari Fleischer, Bush spokesperson, responded to Däubler-Gmelin: “This statement is outrageous and it is inexplicable.”

No doubt what stung Fleischer as much as Däubler-Gmelin’s comments was Schröder’s opposition to German involvement in a war against Iraq—a position that played a major role in securing victory for the Social Democrats in recent German elections. Given Germany’s interventions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, Schröder’s opposition to Bush’s crusade appears to have been politically calculated: Germans, as are a growing number of Europeans, are increasingly uneasy about U.S. ambitions in the Middle East. Schröder and Green party leader Joschka Fischer tried to mend fences by thanking the United States for its role in defeating global fascism and its support during the fall of communism. And Schröder removed both Däubler-Gmelin and Stiegler from his government for their insensitive remarks. But the Bush administration was not in a forgiving mood. The Schröder campaign, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld complained, had the effect of “poisoning a relationship.” So upset with Schröder was Bush that he broke with custom and did not call the chancellor to congratulate him on his win.

Meanwhile, the Bush recession drags on. The number of people living in poverty is increasing, the job market is stagnant, and the inequality gap is again widening, according to the Census Bureau’s annual report on income and poverty. Even the middle class is feeling the impact of economic contraction. Weekly, trusted corporations are being revealed as corrupt. And the more Americans learn about the events leading up to September 11, the more they realize that the disaster probably could have been averted.

Could Bush’s war rhetoric be, as Däubler-Gmelin suggested, a tactic to divert attention from the failures of the Bush administration? In a September 24 New York Times editorial, Paul Krugman compares the current Bush doctrine to nineteenth-century imperialism, a strategy he sees as diversionary. “It’s hard not to suspect,” Krugman writes, “that the Bush doctrine is also a diversion—a diversion from the real issues of dysfunctional security agencies, a sinking economy, a devastated budget and a tattered relationship with our allies.”

As Marxists, we regularly theorize situations where the do-

(Continued on page 6)
Global Marxism
Introduction
John Foran
University of California, Santa Barbara

This third installment in the “Global Marxism” series is the first not written by myself, and I am grateful to Al Sargis for proposing it. I would welcome others to contribute to the column by contacting me in advance about their ideas (foran@soc.ucsb.edu). This project is an attempt to take the world, especially the Third World, as the subject of Marxism: “subject” both in the sense of what Marxism as an approach could be about, and in the sense of centering the agency of people in the Third World.

This essay is a brief but wide-ranging introduction to the ways in which Marxism is taught in China, with insight also into its complex reception by intellectuals and the general public. It suggests the special problems of developing Marxist work in a society where it is the official ideology, as well as something of the present accomplishments and future potential of Marxism in the world’s most populous country. As its author memorably states, “Marxism is nothing if it is not international” – a fitting epigram for building Global Marxisms.

Chinese Marxism as a Party-State Enterprise:
A Brief Organizational Overview

Al L. Sargis
Center for Marxist Education, Cambridge, MA

As a party-state enterprise, Chinese Marxism has some noticeable contradictions. On the one hand, China has the most teachers and researchers of Marxism of any country, while, on the other, Marxism is a minority discourse among intellectuals. Marxism courses are required for university students, yet most students have told me it is catechistically taught, regurgitated for exams and promptly forgotten—or worse, dismissed as it conflicts with their everyday perceptions. Marxism is the “spiritual backbone of the Communist Party,” but a significant number of party members do not adhere to it in theory or practice.

In order to comprehend the dimensions of Chinese Marxism, let’s look first at some of its quantitative aspects. Because every university student must take between one and five courses in Marxism, a corps of teachers is required. With some 1,984 institutions of higher education, that means several thousand. Faculty usually are organized within departments of Marxism, but they also may be found in Marxism sections in philosophy, economics, political science and other academic departments. Add to that the research organizations devoted to Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory—and perhaps soon, Jiang Zemin’s Ideology, as well as related issues such as “Party-Building.” These exist in every provincial and municipal Academy of Social Sciences plus in universities and other public organizations. Then there are political educators in mass organizations, media, state enterprises and government units, who have at least a B.A. in Marxism studies (specializing in “Ideology Education”). Also included must be faculty who teach a variety of courses from a Marxist perspective. A conservative total estimate would be at least 20,000. There are also numerous Marxism journals published by the Communist Party, academic and research organizations and the mass media. And, of course, many other journals exist where Marxist scholars can find an outlet.

(Continued on page 4)
Beyond all this is the Internet, where “some of the best work” on Marxism is written and debated. How large an audience this reaches was indicated by the manager of a Marxist website who has 50,000 subscribers! While this is a space beyond the institutions that normally "host" the party-state Marxist enterprise, web sites for the latter have increased greatly over the past two years. However, it remains a medium for Marxist explorations beyond the boundaries stipulated for official state-party outlets.

Chinese Marxism scholars produce a literature from the mundane to the esoteric to the profound. Many perceive their literature is qualitatively limited, compared with Marxism that in other countries, especially in the West. One amelioration is the tendency since 1998 to seek out "foreign Marxists." This is indicated by the increasing Chinese attendance at Marxist scholars conferences in other countries, holding international conferences in China, publishing in foreign journals, increasing translations of foreign Marxist writings, and invitations to foreign Marxists to lecture in China. This also reflects a view that "Chinese Marxism is at the crossroads" and a concern that "there is no consensus in Marxism circles about the way forward for socialism in China."

But as "professional Marxists" they need only be academically, not ideologically, committed to Marxism. Marxism educators have estimated to me that only between 5% and 20% of their colleagues "believe in it" (i.e., are ideologically committed). This does not necessarily mean that the others do not "believe in" some form of socialism. But it appears that scholars most committed to Marxism are those who teach other subjects from a Marxist viewpoint because they do so out of conviction, not out of necessity. This is reinforced by a policy whereby many students majoring in Marxism are recruited by promises of financial aid when other subjects, often their first choice, are filled. In fact, in the "hundred schools of thought" most intellectuals adhere to schools other than Marxism, including anti-Marxist neo-liberalism.

Regarding perceptions of socialism among the larger population, there is a pragmatic bent. That is, if their working and living conditions are improving in a party-state system calling itself socialist, then socialism is good; if the opposite is occurring then socialism is bad. Obviously there are mixed views among different classes, strata and groups given, their expectations, changing life experiences and actual conditions. Probably most Chinese adhere to social justice values. Among students the largest plurality appear confused about the nature and direction of China. While workers and peasants in general adhere to socialist values, those older than 40 do so more consistently. Professionals and private business owners and managers appear the least socialist-oriented. However, considering the mixed messages coming from the party-state about "getting rich" individuals may balance quite conflicting views about the capitalism-socialism question.

There is a minority of good core-course Marxism teachers, usually ones who relate theory to practice in the Chinese context. But training such teachers largely depends on their initial motivation, as well as the quality of their education. One graduate faculty of future Marxism educators told me, "We only have slim fragments of socialism in China, so I try to expand their vision about the possibilities by concentrating on radical social change movements in other parts of the world."

Of course, these problems are endemic to a structure where Marxism is an official party-state ideology, an issue which deserves consideration beyond the scope of this article.

Given the ramified structure of Marxist education and research—not to mention divergent political views—various ideological tendencies have arisen within "Marxism circles." A different—and lengthy—article would be necessary to describe the major analytical contents of Marxist philosophy, social sciences and humanities. However, one can discern left-center-right Marxist tendencies around their views of current reforms. It is not a question of pro-or anti-reform, but one of the scope, pace and trajectory of reform. (For a detailed description of Chinese Marxist tendencies see my "Ideological Tendencies and Reform Policy in China’s ‘Primary Stage of Socialism,’ Nature, Society, and Thought, vol. 11, no. 4, 1998, pp. 391-98.)

Briefly, the "left," fewest in numbers, can be divided into old (orthodox Marxist-Leninist) and new (neo-Marxist, neo-Maoist, post-modernist, feminist). The latter often have studied in Europe and North America and been influenced by cultural Marxism and other Western left trends.

The "center," with the largest number, promulgates the party-line Deng Xiaoping Theory (i.e., leans economically towards the market economy and politically-ideologically toward "reform Marxism").

The "right" is the second largest and has segments reflecting the original project of reform as a transition to socialism, market socialists and social democrats.

Each orientation has its particular journals in which their views are exclusively expressed. Different tendencies are disproportionately located in various academic, research, government and mass organizations. In terms of relative political influence, the center’s ideas impact greatly on overall
Marxist Section Business Meeting Notes  
ASA Meetings 2002  
Palmer House Chicago  
August 18, 2002  

Ellen Rosen, Chair of ASA Section on Marxist Sociology

The Business Meeting of the Marxist Section was called to order at 3:30 p.m. Lauren Langman chaired the meeting. It was determined that a quorum was present, with 25 members of the section. Lauren began the meeting with some welcoming remarks and shared the financial information from the Section’s Business Report.

I. The first order of business was the presentation of awards.

A. The Outstanding Book Award was presented by Steven Rosenthal to Eric Neubeck for his book entitled, Welfare Reform.

B. The Lifetime Career Award was jointly presented by Martha Gimenez to James Petras and James Geschwender. Martin Murray offered remarks about the two winners. Jim Geschwender was praised for his long years as Chair of the Sociology Department at Binghamton (SUNY). He was also lauded for his efforts in mentoring a generation of students. Murray described the important work that James Petras has done over his lifetime, not only as a scholar, but also as a community activist and teacher. It was noted that Petras’ book Globalization Unmasked won Canada’s Robert M. Kenney Award.

C. The T.R. Young Award was presented by Lauren Langman to Deborah Rapuano (Loyola University of Chicago)

D. The Al Szymanski Award was presented by Jacqueline Kerrigan to Jason Moore (U.C. Berkeley) for his paper, “The Modern World System as Environmental History.”

II. Program for 2003

Lauren then introduced Ellen Rosen, who will chair the Marxist Section for the 2002-3 academic year;

Program – Two Panels are being planned. These include:

I. “The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Corporate Crime”

Chair – Bert Berberoglu

2. “The Soul of Black Folks—One Hundred Years After”  
Co-Chairs: Walda-Katz Fishman and Jeffrey Halley

The following committees were established:

Nominations Committee: Talmadge Wright (Chair)  
Book Awards Committee: Burt Berberoglu (Chair)  
Student Awards Committee: Jackie Kerrigan (Chair), Ellen Royce  
Lifetime Service Award Committee: Alan Spector (Chair)  
Membership Committee: Martha Gimenez (Chair), Rhonda Levine, Walda Katz Fishman

Marxist Section Officers  
2002-2003

Chair: Ellen I. Rosen, Brandeis University  
Chair-Elect: Kevin Anderson, Purdue University  
Past Chair: Lauren Langman, Loyola University of Chicago  
Secretary/Treasurer: Warren S. Goldstein, University of Central Florida

Council:  
Jeffery A. Halley, University of Texas, San Antonio  
David N. Smith, University of Kansas  
Talmadge Wright, Loyola University Chicago  
John Foran, University of California, Santa Barbara  
Lloyd Klein, Louisiana State University

Newsletter Co-Editors:  
Warren S. Goldstein, University of Central Florida  
William S. Solomon, Rutgers University
The domestic and global fractions of the bourgeoisie fail to unite behind the leader of the world hegemon. Of course, the bourgeoisie is never completely solidary. Yet, it is more than merely ordinary when hawks such as Al Gore question a call for war against such a despicable character as Saddam Hussein, especially so soon after September 11. At any rate, I haven’t the space here to pursue theory. But maybe I don’t have to. Growing opposition to war with Iraq may simply reflect the emerging recognition among many public officials that Bush’s motives are transparent: The president needs to keep the rhetoric of war alive to distract the public from the problems of the country and to keep his poll numbers high. His term in office is one step away from looking like a repeat of his father’s: war, recession, and defeat. Bush II has failed to get Osama bin Laden, and with the economy at a standstill, the administration needs a visible target of evil. Hussein is convenient. But Americans’ support for war, especially over targets of questionable threat, soon weakens. And the more astute fractions of the bourgeoisie, in the United States, in Germany, and elsewhere, desire to be at a distance from reckless defense policy when the Bush popularity bubble bursts.

Let us hope that the bubble bursts before thousands of innocent Iraqi civilians are blown to smithereens by "the unparalleled strength of the United States armed forces."*

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Chinese Marxism (Continued from page 4)  

Policy, the right pushes political reform (e.g., more power vested in the People’s Congresses vis-a-vis the Party) and the left concentrates on ideology. With the partial exception of political educators, all relate mainly to other intellectuals and party-state cadre.

These tendencies, in turn, rest on class and strata which are in various stages of rising and declining power. The whole reform process can be seen as contested terrain both within Marxist circles and between them and the non-Marxist intellectual majority.

While Marxism as party-state ideology may appear as an official bulwark of the existing party-state, it also contains seeds of transformation which, under certain conditions, can extend the Marxist project beyond its current space. These fragments may be seen in internet web sites and chat rooms, specialized tendency journals, Chinese articles in foreign scholarly publications, translated foreign books and articles, conferences (especially those with foreign Marxist participation) and interpersonal discussions. While public fora boundaries for official discourse have flexible limits in accordance with the particular arena and who controls it, there has been a process of both broadening and circumventing these strictures.

Most U.S. Marxists would be more compatible with left tendency varieties. However a paucity of knowledge about "Marxism with Chinese characteristics" prevents even rudimentary knowledge of the field and its rich contents, much less the contacts which are sought after by the Chinese. Conferences, publication, and lecturing in China are available to U.S. Marxist scholars and their Chinese counterparts urge them to take advantage of these opportunities.

In my closing an address to the Marxism 2001 International Conference in Kunming, Yunnan, China, I commented that "Marxism is NOTHING if it is not international." To this day, the Chinese in the audience tell me they remember that line more than anything else I said. It behooves us as Marxist sociologists to extend our reach to those who are so animated by this seemingly commonplace Marxist proposition. If you are interested in pursuing these possibilities contact me at <bigalsez@yahoo.com>.

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The Consciousness of AIDS Researchers, Doctors, and Front Line Workers: Ruminations on the Recent International AIDS Conference

by Sam Friedman

In Press, Against the Current

The author would like to acknowledge assistance and advice from Hunter Gray and Andrew Osborne

Anger in a mixed consciousness

At the opening ceremonies for the International AIDS Conference in Spain in July, I was in a room with 15,000 other people, many of whom are medical doctors, virologists, psychologists, or social workers. The Spanish Health Minister was trying to speak, but was drowned out by a group of some hundred (or more) local activists. None of the people sitting around me knew the specifics of what she had done wrong, but none of us seemed to be angry with the protestors. Indeed, many of us were grinning, and thought it was probably a well-deserved rebuff. A day or two later, her American equivalent, Tommy Thompson (Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, and one of the architects of the attack on welfare when he was governor of Wisconsin), had his speech disrupted by activists, mainly from the United States. Once again, no one I talked with was particularly upset, and many were delighted.

What is happening is that even many of the scientists and doctors involved with AIDS are getting angry, and indeed even somewhat radicalized, by what they are seeing. Put simply, the global HIV epidemic is out of control, and the governments and corporations that have the resources to deal with it have been big with promises but short with cash.

What is the state of the HIV epidemic? According to a report issued by UNAIDS shortly before the conference (http://www.unaids.org/barcelona/presskit/report.html), 40 million people are now living with HIV infection. Three million died last year due to the disease. The epidemic is spreading rapidly—5 million were infected in 2001—and the spread of HIV in Eastern Europe and Asia promises to increase these numbers drastically. In the absence of rapid and large-scale action, 45 million more people will become infected by 2010; UNAIDS estimates that at least 29 million of these infections are preventable.

Treatments do exist that can greatly ameliorate the disease, and prevent death for many years for a large percentage of the infected. Even though mass protests and the actions of drug producers in India and Brazil have led to drastic price decreases for these medications, only 30,000 of the 28.5 million infected people in Africa, compared with 500,000 of 950,000 North Americans, are receiving these drugs.

UNAIDS has estimated that relatively small amounts of money could be enough to prevent most new infections and to provide medications for many millions of the infected. The amount was scheduled to begin in 2002 with about $10 billion dollars a year, and increase gradually over time. Governments promised to provide these funds two years ago, and mechanisms have been set up to disperse them effectively—but the promised money has not arrived. Approximately one billion dollars is on hand. Imagine that! Three million people died last year, 5 million got infected, and the virus is spreading into the huge population centers of Asia, but all the governments of the world cannot mobilize $10 billion a year. Now, this amount of money seems daunting—but it is only about $40 per head for each U.S. resident. Another way to think about it is that in 2001 HIV killed as many people as 1,000 September 11 attacks, and yet is being given (by all governments) only about $1 billion while the U.S. spewed out $60 billion in a special appropriation for the military within a few days after the World Trade Center (where I worked) was destroyed. Other comparisons are that the U.S. brings in about $8 billion per year through taxes on alcohol, and spends $23 billion to buy military aircraft.

Thus, it is no wonder that the thousands of attendees at the AIDS Conference were angry. Indeed, listening to the plenary speeches at the Conference, one speaker after another lambasted the inaction of governments, the greed of corporations, the negative effects of the WTO, the International Monetary Fund, and other neo-liberal trade and financial

(Continued on page 8)
organizations. And the doctors and scientists in the audience would nod in agreement. There were times I could almost imagine that I was at a meeting of supporters of the “anti-globalization” movement. Indeed, I think that AIDS researchers and health care providers probably agree with much of the analysis of what is wrong in the world with the youth and others who have demonstrated against the IMF or WTO.

What is lacking, among many of those present at the Barcelona AIDS Conference, is a politics of what to do about it. These same people who accepted the shouting-down of the Spanish Health Minister and of Tommy Thompson as well-deserved, behaved rather differently at the closing ceremony of the conference a few days later. They gave considerable applause to ex-President Clinton when he stood to speak; and, after he finished a rather demagogic talk, many gave him a standing ovation. This for a man who did very little to fight HIV/AIDS in Africa or Asia when he was President, and who condemned thousands of Americans to AIDS by refusing to fund needle exchange. The acceptance, even applause, for Clinton probably reflects what I think is the most common political approach among the researchers and the front-line prevention and care workers in the AIDS field. They are angry, but they still are hoping that the self-evident horror of the epidemic, and the relatively limited amount of resources that (we are told) could greatly stem its impact, will lead “good Czars” among the politicians to do what is right. Even the U.S. government, which is widely recognized to be well behind other governments in seeing the importance of a response, has realized that AIDS is a “national security issue.” (This is because many of the soldiers who prop up allied dictators are infected; and also because mass anger at the failure of governments to act in Africa, East Europe, or Asia could become the basis for mass radicalization.)

So far, of course, the self-evident horror of the epidemic has not led to action. This is why doctors and others are angry, and why they are to some degree supportive of activists who demonstrate and even those who shout down politicians or who “trash” the booths of some of the pharmaceutical companies in the exhibit hall.

**Radicalism is an important current**

There is also a sizeable radical current in the AIDS world. Some of this is expressed in the existence of organized activist groups, but it goes much beyond that. For example, I have a friend who is a medical doctor in Australia. He has been in the forefront of efforts to deal with HIV and hepatic C among injection drug users in Australia and Asia. Politically, he has always seemed well to my right. Prior to the Afghan War, he focused his criticisms of the U.S. on its destructive War on Drugs policies. Now, he has generalized his anger and his critique. During the AIDS conference, he gave me a hard time about the arrogant and destructive behavior of the U.S. government in the military and diplomatic arenas. He did this even though he knows that I oppose U.S. arrogance and imperialism. Indeed, he knows that my response to September 11 was, among other things, to take part in peace demonstrations, to write an article about how the Afghan War would spread HIV around Central Asia and perhaps well beyond (which is forthcoming in AIDS), and to write a book of poems opposing the war from the perspective of someone whose office in the World Trade Center was destroyed.

This point is worth phrasing in another way: War spreads HIV and other diseases. The U.S. “War on Terror” has undoubtedly led to many new HIV infections among refugees who have been sexually assaulted, among drug users in Pakistan who have been forced to inject drugs due to disruptions in the opium and heroin supplies, and perhaps among US, Canadian or other soldiers who have coerced or bought sex from Afghans. Furthermore, the enormous expenditure of money on war and its preparation have diverted funds from AIDS research, prevention, and care, and have reduced the priority that governments and corporations have put on finding the $10 billion a year that they had promised for the global effort against AIDS. The doctors, researchers, and front-line care-givers and prevention educators at the AIDS Conference know this. And it helps to fuel their anger.

**Towards an “AIDS left”?**

At the Conference, I engaged in a degree of discussion with people over whether it would make sense to organize an explicit left wing in “the AIDS movement.” This perspective is based on several observations: First, HIV/AIDS is increasingly becoming a “big issue” both in national and international politics.

Second, the HIV epidemic is structured by the patterns of exploitation and oppression that structure the world. The epidemic is spreading rapidly in the poorest countries and in those that have been forced into political and social crisis (“transitions”) by the rigors of a “globalized” economic crisis (combined, in many cases, with struggles from below by students, workers, peasants, and others affected by these crises). Within countries, it is the poor, the workers, the racially/ethnically subordinated, women, and sexual minorities...
who often bear the brunt of the epidemic. There is mounting evidence that the increasing inequality fostered by neoliberalism is associated with HIV spread.

Efforts by left forces already have had important positive effects in the AIDS epidemic, although in most cases we have been a small part of larger movements. Such movements have:

Fought for, and made some (but limited) progress in getting the prices of medications for developing countries lowered.

Fought for, and had some success in, defending the civil liberties and privacy rights of those infected or at risk.

Fought for, and in many cases won, a place at planning tables for people with HIV/AIDS, for gays and lesbians, for injection drug users, for sex workers, and for women, and for racially/ethnically subordinated groups. This “place at the table” is clearly much less than is needed, however.

Been part of mobilizations-from-below that have established a variety of AIDS service organizations and prevention programs in a wide variety of countries.

The absence of an explicit left may have contributed to a number of failures of the movement:

HIV research remains dominated both by individualism, the ideology of the neo-liberalizers, and by a “medical model” ideology that sees health as an issue of doctors and other biomedically trained personnel treating patients one by one. This medical model incorporates the concerns and needs of drug companies and medical institutions and pre-disposes thought towards individualism (as the appropriate way to think about “patients”) and away from models of community-based prevention or socioeconomic change.

Front-line workers in HIV prevention and AIDS care, and also in research, remain by and large under-unionized. Where unionized, they generally lack means for expression of their particular needs. Workers’ political needs in the HIV/AIDS field lack articulation except through unions dominated by neoliberal-affected versions of social democracy, liberalism, or “plain and simple” unionism.

There has been a failure to establish an effective alliance of AIDS movements with many insurgent forces around the world. These include the youth and workers who have been holding demonstrations against globalization; the workers who have been fighting a wide range of corporate and governmental belt-tightening demands (such as the unemployed piqueteros [pickets] whose demonstrations have energized the revolt in Argentina); and the rural and urban poor who have been fighting corporate and latifundista pollution and resource-destruction in their communities.

Thus, at a time when it is becoming clear that HIV/AIDS is a part of “big politics and economics,” HIV/AIDS activists and researchers continue to function primarily at the level of local communities or national policies. The wealthy and powerful have their own ways to further their interests in this crisis, whether these interests involve ignoring HIV where this seems best, or profiting from it. The interests of the huge majority of the people of the world around HIV/AIDS (as around all issues) remain un-represented or, where ostensibly spoken for, misrepresented.

One way to approach this might be to try to develop an explicit “AIDS left.” This would be difficult. Many friends might oppose the “politicizing” of public health. Some of these may see the response to HIV/AIDS as science-driven, but most are not so naive. But many others may think that a posture of political neutrality is the most effective way to get good public health.

Others may take a position “against politicizing science” for less benign reasons. One group of these will be representatives of upper middle class patients whose needs are being met quite well; or some researchers whose main constituency fits this model. Still others will be officials and mid-level employees of national or local health departments—for whom the “science-based public policy” perspective is a deeply-institutionalized organizational defense mechanism that obscures political failures by their respective States.

Of course, the largest opposition would be from the main defenders of the current socioeconomic order. In this case, such opposition would be especially likely from high-level government officials, drug companies, and some U.N. officials. Their response might mix red-baiting with a “science-based public policy” argument—even though their response to the HIV epidemic has flouted the recommendations of scientists and human decency alike. In addition, some might use the existence of an organized AIDS left as an excuse with which to justify bad policies that they would implement in any case. This would create difficulties for the left with some of our potential friends in community-based organizations and elsewhere, some of whom might believe the official rhetoric blaming us for the policies of the powerful.

The biggest difficulty, however, may be to find a short-term role for an AIDS left. In the long run, however, its value (if successful) is clear—a way to help organize people for political and social struggles that are needed both in order to get this epidemic under control and also to deal with a lot of other huge problems.

Lawrence Lessig doesn’t want to look like a radical. He appeals to markets, he’s a law professor who cites law and economics arguments from Richard Posner, an activist who finds Orrin Hatch to be an intellectual soulmate on many issues. Lessig wants to seem firmly in the mainstream of policy thought on issues of intellectual property. The fact that he is treated like a radical shows just how much this policy arena has been hijacked by the Jack Valentis and Stephen Cases of this world.

Lessig’s previous book, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999), was easily the most sensible book about the Internet. Lucidly arguing that code amounted to a new kind of law for a new kind of space, Lessig argued that it was necessary to pay careful attention to how especially the new giants of the Internet could use code to reconstruct the architecture of the Net, turning it from a space of freedom and equality into a series of privately controlled fiefdoms. In the two short years between that book and this, the feudalization of the Internet has moved at a rapid pace, helped by policymakers and legislators who have willingly extended and/or passively condoned the expansion and concentration of control, especially by the largest corporate players. In the shorthand of his section titles, Lessig dubs this a move from dot.commons to dot.control.

The Future of Ideas analyzes this transformation, concentrating on the Internet’s “innovation commons,” by which Lessig means all the spaces, code, and ideas not privately held, which operate as a resource for innovation. Analyzing the Net on three levels—physical, code, and content— he shows how, at an early stage, the Internet was a bountiful commons. The wires and servers that provided its infrastructure did not discriminate among uses and users; the code that structured the architecture of the Net kept intelligence at the edges, allowing applications to circulate and mutate freely; and the content of the Net, technologically habile for perfect copying, was largely shared. The result was a tremendous burst of innovation of all sorts—artistic, commercial, political.

Law, commerce, and technology have since threatened what remains of this commons. Law has extended copyright and patent protection, commerce has imported the model of the mass media, and technology has offered both tools for surveillance and control and means for preventing copying and sharing. The future of the Internet, and the future of ideas, looks bleak—Microsoft and AOL-Time Warner as far as the eye can see.

“The feudalization of the Internet has moved at a rapid pace, helped by policymakers and legislators who have willingly extended and/or passively condoned the expansion and concentration of control, especially by the largest corporate players.”

The tragedy of this privatization of the commons, for Lessig, is that it will stifle individual experimentation and innovation. In his telling analysis of the history and theory of copyright law, he notes that the U.S. constitution provided for copyright for a limited time only, to control commercial exploitation only, and only in order that social utility be served by creating an incentive for people to produce new things. In the past forty years, the copyright regime has been so distorted that its original intentions are being disserved: instead of enticing innovation, copyright chills it. Hardly one to argue that intellectual property is intellectual theft (although his argument rests on the premise that all innovation rests on existing ideas), Lessig’s proposals are very sensible—limiting terms of copyright, requiring regular renewals, rethinking the notion of patenting business models, limiting patents for software. Because it is hard to understand how reasonable people could find his proposals dangerous, it is all the more distressing to acknowledge that one expects there is zero probability that any of them will be enacted—even with Orrin Hatch on his side.

Nor does Lessig himself play the Pollyanna. Recognizing the tremendous power of the “media monopoly,” he seems to have little faith in the power of ideas to sway the legislative arena. His book ends on a pessimistic note. But perhaps he should never have been so optimistic. The Internet that he loved, the commons of innovation, existed only by accident, largely as a byproduct of federal defense spending. The
Internet revolution, as charming as it was, could never have been anything more than a metaphor for the revolution that will ultimately bring down the “dinosaurs,” as he calls the old mass media companies that are coming to dominate the web.

The romanticism of the internet enthusiasts included not just a belief in freedom (the electronic frontier), but also a belief in equality, community, and democracy. Little of the love of equality lingers in Lessig’s account, which tends to admire the innovative elite and worry about the social cost of hampering their activity. Here, as in Code, he acknowledges his intellectual debt to John Stuart Mill. And there is none of the clowing appeal to community that marks, say, Cass Sunstein’s Republic.com. But there is finally a grim demoralization regarding democracy here. Lessig believes in the traditions and procedures of constitutional law and governance, but becomes dyspeptic at the end when he contemplates a future regime made by judges. He believes in the power of citizen action, and is an advocate with a powerful and very persuasive voice. Ultimately, though, he recognizes that hundreds of thousands of citizen activists can be cancelled out by a couple of FCC appointments.

Anyone who wants to understand intellectual property law in the digital age should read this book—you won’t find one better-written, better-reasoned, or by a more intelligent author. Anyone who wants to understand the desperation of liberals in the policy arena should read it too.*

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**News Flash!!!: Marxist Section Membership Reaches 320**

On October 1, 2002, the Marxist Section of the American Sociological Association reached 320 members. This was after the section reached an all-time low of 268 members reported at the beginning of September. After being notified of this by the ASA, section officers began a membership drive which resulted in 52 new members, a gain of almost 20 percent. We would like to thank all of you who have helped us reach this goal. Particular thanks go to *Monthly Review* for donating 32 six month subscriptions. Thanks also go to David Fasenfest (Wayne State University), Rodney Coates (Miami University), and William Chambliss (George Washington University), each of whom generously donated money for student memberships. We also would like to thank members of other sections for supporting us, in particular Environment and Technology, Political Economy of the World Systems (PEWS), and Race, Class and Gender. Special thanks and congratulations go to John Bellamy Foster, Martha Gimenez, Lauren Langman and Ellen Rosen, without whose hard work, this membership drive would not have been successful. We also would like to thank all those new members for joining and those of you who helped us in getting them to join.

**Progressive Sociologists Network Listserv**

If you would like to exchange views with like-minded colleagues, you can join PSN - Progressive Sociologists Network, by sending mail to majordomo@csf.colorado.edu In the message proper simply write TWO words: subscribe PSN.

**Marxist Section Listserv**

The Marxist Section now has a new listserv. If you are a member of the section, you should be on it. However, there are many incorrect or missing e-mails. This information comes from your most recent ASA membership application. If we are missing your e-mail, we have been trying to contact you. If you would like to provide us with your most recent e-mail address, please send it to wgoldstein@mail.ucf.edu. To send e-mails to the whole list, the address is: marsec@lists.brandeis.edu
New Book Announcements

Just Published!

Making Sweatshops by Ellen Israel Rosen

“Making Sweatshops reveals the inexorable movement toward an open trading system, the shifting alignments of actors pushing for or opposing openness, and, most centrally, how trade policy promotes the globalization of apparel production. It fills a gap in our understanding of these dynamics,” says Richard Appelbaum, author of Behind the Label: Inequality in the Los Angeles Apparel Industry.

“Rosen convincingly demonstrates that it is the transnational corporations rather than the consumers, and certainly rather than the workers, who benefit from trade liberalization, whose rules the lobbyist for these very corporations more or less write for supine politicians. This is a book in the great tradition of scholarship allied with deep commitment to the cause of global economic justice,” says Leslie Sklair, London School of Economics and author of Globalization: Capitalism and its Alternatives.

Power, Profits and Patriarchy by William G. Staples and Clifford L. Staples.

"No one can read this book and continue to doubt that the development of capitalism was a gendered process.”  Ava Baron, American Journal of Sociology